

Atty. Docket No. 394423

REMARKS/ARGUMENTS

Claims 1, 3-7, 9-21, 23-41, 63-68, 70 and 71 remain pending in the instant application. Claim 1 and withdrawn claim 63 are amended to correct the same typographical error. Claim 1 is additionally amended to incorporate the limitations of dependent claim 2. Claim 2 is cancelled, accordingly, and claims 3 and 12 are amended to correct antecedence, with claim 3 additionally amended to reflect the language of amended claim 1. Claim 8 is also cancelled, and claim 25 is amended, to clarify that Applicants' first and second kiosks are different. Claim 9 is amended to reflect the language of amended claim 1. Claim 22 is cancelled to differentiate between Applicants' first and third kiosks. Claim 24 is amended to correct antecedence, to correct a typographical error and to remove redundant wording.

Claim 25 is amended to correct antecedence and to add the steps of profiling user transactions and communicating advertising information based on the profiling. This amendment is fully supported, for example at p. 5, line 31- p. 6, line 11 and pursuant support from the specification. Withdrawn claim 67 is amended to correctly reference the "plurality of kiosks" in base claim 63.

Claims 1-7 and 9-41 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103, as discussed herein below. It is believed that the above claim amendments and the following remarks address each issue raised in the Office Action dated 02 May 2006. The subheadings used herein correspond to the issues presented in said Office Action.

Claim Objections

The Examiner objects to claim 8, stating "Claim 8 recites that the first kiosk is the second kiosk, which does not appear to be logically possible, since first and second kiosks would appear to be two unique items." Office Action p. 2, ¶ 1. In accordance with the Examiner's request for correction, claim 8 is cancelled herewith. The cancellation of claim 8 clarifies that the first and second kiosks are unique items (as noted by the Examiner). Therefore, pursuant the Examiner's note, we respectfully request

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withdrawal of the interpretation that "renting and returning a movie from a single kiosk is...renting from a first kiosk and returning to a second kiosk." Office Action p. 2, ¶ 2.

Claim Rejections – 35 U.S.C. § 103

Given the cancellation of claims 2, 8 and 22, claims 1, 3-7, 9-21 and 23-41 stand rejected as being unpatentable over Kanoh in view of U.S. Patent No. 5,028,766 (hereinafter, "Shah") and U.S. Patent Publication No. US2005/0267819 (hereinafter, "Kaplan"). We respectfully disagree and traverse the rejection, for at least the following reasons:

Independent Claim 1: In order to render claim 1 *prima facie* obvious, the combined references must teach or suggest all of the elements of the claim. In particular, Kanoh in view of Shah and Kaplan must teach or suggest Applicants' method for distributing optical recorded media, including the following elements:

- (a) determining, at the server, inventory of the optical recorded media of each of the kiosks;
- (b) routinely obtaining, at the server, operational status of each of the kiosks;
and
- (c) automatically interfacing with a first user via a touch screen at a first kiosk in a first transaction for first local optical recorded media, the touch screen providing a touch-selectable listing of optical recorded media, including the first local optical recorded media, contained within the first kiosk, the first kiosk being one of the kiosks, the first user being one of the users;
- (d) dispensing the first local optical media from the first kiosk to the first user if the first transaction is approved; and
- (e) accepting return of the first local optical media at a second kiosk, the second kiosk being another one of the kiosks.

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The Examiner recognizes, and we agree, that Kanoh does not teach elements (a)-(c). See Office Action p. 3, ¶ 2. However, we must disagree with the Examiner's position that Shah and Kaplan supply these missing elements.

For example, the Examiner asserts that Shah determines operational status of a kiosk, comprising receiving statistics of transaction records. The Examiner notes that these are "statistics showing rental activity". Office Action p. 3, ¶ 3. Respectfully, receiving statistics showing rental activity is different from routinely obtaining operational status, e.g., whether the kiosk is on or off, as recited in the '444 Application. Shah nowhere mentions operational status of a kiosk, nor does Shah describe polling a kiosk to determine whether it is on or off. See, e.g., Specification p. 14, lines 16-19. Rather, we believe Shah's statistics are gathered in order to update inventory information and/or card data on a selection terminal, or to generate reports:

"A central data center has been shown which interacts with each station as well as updating the remote selection terminal. The software may include master member files, *statistics of transaction records that it receives from each station periodically, updating inventory listing of each station on a corresponding selection terminal*, updating bad card data with a bad card file in each station and each selection terminal, and making financial and other reports." Shah col. 3, lines 52-60, emphasis added.

Shah cannot (and does not) directly obtain operational status of a kiosk at a server. The Examiner appears to argue that Shah can verify operational status of a kiosk by obtaining statistics. However, Shah suggests no such thing. There is absolutely no teaching or suggestion in Shah of any system, program or method for determining whether or not a kiosk is operational by gathering (or not gathering) statistics. Absent such teaching, Shah fails to teach or suggest at least element (b) of Applicant's claim 1.

Adding Kaplan does not remedy this failure, as Kaplan also fails to teach or suggest element (b), at least. Kaplan is for example silent as to obtaining operational

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status of a kiosk; Kaplan recites polling kiosks (and this is not recited as a routine operation) only to gather information to create market research products:

"Each time a subscriber activates the kiosk at the scanner 50 to begin a session, a data file is created identifying the subscriber and generating a selection preview... The centralized database 60 can poll each kiosk station 10 at all of the remote locations through a telecommunications link. The information gathered will be analyzed and packaged into market research products for distribution in the record industry and radio stations." Kaplan, ¶ [0046].

This is clearly different from routinely obtaining, at the server, operational status of a kiosk.

Furthermore, Kanoh in view of Shah and Kaplan does not teach or suggest dispensing optical recorded media from a first kiosk, and accepting return of the optical recorded media at a second kiosk, as in claim 1 elements (d) and (e), above.

In the pending Office Action, the Examiner rejected claim 2 (now cancelled and incorporated into claim 1), stating that Kanoh shows returning a CD to a second kiosk comprising a first kiosk. We respectfully disagree. The Examiner has indicated that *when the claims are clarified to show that first and second kiosks are different, the interpretation that "renting and returning a movie from a single kiosk is... renting from a first kiosk and returning to a second kiosk" will be withdrawn.* Office Action p. 2, ¶ 2, emphasis added. The cancellation of claim 8 serves to clarify that first and second kiosks are different. We therefore believe that the above interpretation should be withdrawn.

Absent this interpretation, Kanoh clearly does not teach or suggest accepting return of a first optical media at a (different) second kiosk. Rather, Kanoh notes "It is not unusual for a user to erroneously return the wrong video cassette." Kanoh col. 9, lines 54-55. "When the video cassette is erroneously returned, notice is provided to the user

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instructing them to remove the video cassette from the renting and returning opening 36." Kanoh col. 6, lines 13-16. Kanoh does not teach or suggest returning a cassette to an apparatus other than that from which the cassette was originally rented. Absent such teaching, a "wrong" video cassette would logically include one not rented from the apparatus at which a user attempts a return.

We note that Shah and Kaplan also fail to teach returning optical recorded media to a kiosk other than the kiosk that it was rented from. Shah actually teaches away from element (e) by claiming a signal that is energized when an article deposited into a bin does not have the correct identification code for that bin. See Shah claim 17. Kaplan does not dispense articles from a kiosk or accept returned articles at a kiosk. Rather, Kaplan provides a listening station where users can preview samples of media that may be purchased from a local or on-line store. Claim element (e) is plainly not taught or suggested by the Kanoh/Shah/Kaplan combination.

As shown, the cited patents do not teach or suggest all of the elements of amended claim 1, and therefore cannot and do not establish *prima facie* obviousness.

Claims 5 and 7: Regarding these claims, the Examiner first states: "Kanoh shows capturing a second code on the first optical medium and scanning the image to determine a disk identifier (the second code comprising a second portion of the bar code containing this information)." Office Action p. 4, ¶ 2. This limitation comes from claim 5. Claim 5 depends from claim 3, which requires capturing a first code...to determine a group identifier.

The Examiner then seemingly reverses his position in an alternative rejection, stating: "Kanoh et al in view of Shah and Kaplan show all elements *except capturing a first and second code in order to capture the group identifier and the disk identifier.*" Office Action p. 4, ¶ 4, emphasis added. We are puzzled as to how Kanoh alone can show capturing a first (claim 3) and second (claim 5) code to determine group (claim 3) and disk (claim 5) identifiers, if Kanoh plus two other references does not show these same features. We respectfully request clarification of the Examiner's position.

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However, regardless of the Examiner's stance, we contend that claims 5 and 7 are not obvious. First, as noted, claims 5 and 7 depend from claim 3. Like claim 1, claim 3 also includes the limitation of accepting optical media at a kiosk (a second kiosk) other than the kiosk (first kiosk) from which the media was rented. As we have noted in prior submissions, Kanoh does not teach or suggest this limitation, and indeed teaches away from accepting media from a first kiosk at a second kiosk by charging a user for media that is not returned to its rental kiosk. See, e.g., p. 17, ¶ 3 of Applicants' "Amendment and Remarks" responsive to the Office Action of 12-29-05 (hereinafter, "Applicants' prior Response").

Claim 3 also recites a first code that may be scanned to determine a group identifier that indicates which of the kiosks the first optical media may be returned to, and accepting the first optical media at the second kiosk when the second kiosk is associated with the group identifier. As further described in the specification, "Preferably, two bar codes are read, specifying a "group" association and an individual media identification. A 'group' bar code specifies how one optical media may travel between kiosks (for example, one distributor may control several kiosks and yet permit returns to any of the kiosks)." Specification p. 5, lines 8-11. As noted above with respect to claim 1, Kanoh does not provide for accepting return of optical media at a second kiosk if the optical media was dispensed from a first kiosk. Indeed, we submit that Kanoh's aforementioned charges and notice mechanism teach against returning a cassette to a kiosk other than the rental kiosk. As also noted with respect to claim 1, Kaplan and Shah do not provide for returning a media to a second kiosk, if it was dispensed at a first kiosk. Since Kanoh in view of Kaplan and Shah do not teach or suggest all of the limitations of base claim 3 (or base claim 1, which is nonobvious for at least the reasons argued above), the combination cannot render claims 5 and 7 *prima facie* obvious.

Claim 5 additionally requires capturing a second code on the first optical media and scanning the image to determine a disk identifier, the disk identifier uniquely identifying the first optical media, and reporting inventory of the first optical media to the

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central server if the first optical media is accepted at the second kiosk. Kanoh does not provide for capturing a uniquely-identifying disk identifier from a optical recorded media accepted at a second kiosk, when the optical recorded media was rented from a first kiosk. Kanoh only recites the erroneous return of video cassettes, and provides not even a hint that the reader 61 is capable of reading optical recorded media from other kiosks. As mentioned, Shah and Kaplan are also silent as to any such capability.

Claim 7 recites that one or both of the first code and the second code are bar codes. The Examiner has stated that Kanoh shows a "second code comprising a second portion of the bar code containing this information." Office Action p. 4, ¶ 2. We respectfully disagree. First, we do not find this teaching in Kanoh, and we request that the Examiner point out where it is found. However, we must point out that even if the Examiner is able to show this feature in Kanoh, one or both of a first and second code being bar codes (claim 7) is different from a first code and a second code being parts of bar codes, as the Examiner asserts. We further note that the Examiner indicates that Kanoh does not scan two bar codes (as is possible in claim 7), stating that "it would have been an obvious matter of design choice to modify the method of Kanoh et al by scanning two bar codes (*instead of one as in Kanoh*)". Office Action p. 4, ¶ 4, emphasis added.

Respectfully, Kanoh in view of Shah and Kaplan do not teach or suggest the limitations of claims 5 and 7, especially not in the context of its base claims 3 and 1.

We must also disagree with the Examiner's alternative statement that "the application does not disclose that storing and scanning the information in two separate codes solves a particular problem or is for any particular purpose." Office Action p. 4, ¶ 4. On the contrary, the '444 Application clearly notes that two bar codes allow optical media to travel between kiosks, e.g., to permit returns of the media to any of the kiosks. See Specification p. 5, lines 8-13, quoted above. In addition, reading (and identification) of bar code 701A results in (i.e., has a purpose of) opening a kiosk door. Reading and identification of bar code 701B leads to (i.e., has a purpose of) registering optical recorded media in inventory. See Specification, p. 21, lines 25-30, quoted above. On

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the other hand, the Kanoh/Shah/Kaplan combination does not teach or suggest two bar codes, particularly not two bar codes that serve the purposes described herein.

Claims 4 and 6: The Examiner notes that Kanoh in view of Shah and Kaplan do not teach rotating an image via internal software and rescanning to determine information in a code. However, the Examiner takes official notice that such limitation is old and well known. Respectfully, the Examiner's official notice is a moot point, since claim 4 depends from (and benefits from the arguments presented in support of) claims 3 and 1. Claim 6 depends from claims 5, 3 and 1, and also benefits from the arguments presented in support of these claims. Furthermore, regardless of whether rotating an image is old and well known, we contend that its combination with the features of claims 4 and 6 (and their respective base and intervening claims) is novel.

Claims 9-11: The Examiner recognizes that the Kanoh/Shah/Kaplan combination does not teach the elements of these claims, but contends that it would have been an obvious matter of design choice to modify Kanoh by sensing characteristics of a case (i.e., one or more holes or blocked regions) housing a medium and determining if the characteristics match predetermined characteristics. We respectfully disagree. None of Kanoh, Shah and Kaplan make provision for sensing case characteristics. Furthermore, claims 9-11 depend from claim 1 and intervening claim 3, and thus benefit from like argument.

Claim 9 also recites opening a door to an input/output slot of the first kiosk to accept the case and optical media when the characteristics match the predetermined characteristics (e.g., the holes or blocked regions on a case). Kanoh specifies an opposite order of operations, and thus teaches away from (a) sensing characteristics and then (b) opening a door if there is a match. For example, Kanoh recites: "During a returning control operation, when the return key 37c is pressed, *the renting and returning opening 36 is opened to receive the video cassette (step ST71). The identification information, such as bar code adhered on the video cassette is read by the reader 61 (step ST72).*" Kanoh col. 7, lines 47-49, emphasis added; FIG. 7. We

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submit that it would not have been an obvious matter of design choice to modify Kanoh as the examiner suggests, *because Kanoh teaches away from the order of operation presented in claims 9-11.*

Claims 13-17, 20, 21, 24-30, 33 and 38-41: The Examiner has rejected these claims as being obvious, by taking official notice that elements of the rejected claims are "notoriously old and well known." Before specifically addressing the rejection of these claims, we respectfully remind the Examiner that:

"To reach a proper determination under 35 U.S.C. 103, the examiner must step backward in time and into the shoes worn by the hypothetical "person of ordinary skill in the art" *when the invention was unknown and just before it was made.* In view of all factual information, the examiner must then make a determination whether the claimed invention "as a whole" would have been obvious at that time to that person. Knowledge of applicant's disclosure must be put aside in reaching this determination, yet kept in mind in order to determine the "differences," conduct the search and evaluate the "subject matter as a whole" of the invention. The tendency to resort to "hindsight" based upon applicant's disclosure is often difficult to avoid due to the very nature of the examination process. However, impermissible hindsight must be avoided and the legal conclusion must be reached on the basis of the facts gleaned from the prior art." MPEP 2142, emphasis added.

We contend that regardless of the Examiner's official notice, it would not have been obvious to combine the "official notice" features with the applicable of Kanoh, Shah and Kaplan. In other words, the combined features of these claims is not known. Furthermore, there is no suggestion or motivation within Kanoh to make such combinations. We therefore again request evidence (MPEP §2144) that such combinations would have been obvious at the time the invention was made.

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Claims 13-15: The Examiner notes that Kanoh does not show imaging a user interacting with a kiosk, but takes official notice that it is "old and well known in the art" to do so. We respectfully disagree with and traverse the rejection, at least because claims 13-15 benefit from the arguments presented in support of claim 1, above. The issue of official notice is therefore moot, since a dependent claim is non-obvious if its base claim is non-obvious. We request reconsideration and we again request evidence that such combinations would have been obvious at the time the invention was made, pursuant to MPEP §2142 and §2144, respectively.

Claims 13-16: The Examiner again takes official notice that although Kanoh does not image a user, it is "old and well known" to do so. We request evidence, pursuant MPEP 2144, that such feature, *in the combination presented in the claims*, would have been obvious at the time that the invention was made. However, we also note that regardless of the official notice, claims 13-16 depend from claim 1, and are therefore non-obvious. Reconsideration pursuant to MPEP §2142 is requested.

Claims 13 and 17: We again note that claims 13 and 17 depend from claim 1 (and benefit from like argument), and are thus believed allowable regardless of the Examiner's official notice features. However, we do once again request reconsideration and evidence pursuant to MPEP §2142 and §2144, respectively.

Claims 20 and 21: These claims stand rejected per the Examiner's official notice that providing advertising information to a third kiosk, on a screen and audibly communicated, is "old and well known". Again, we must disagree, and we request reconsideration and evidence pursuant to MPEP §2142 and §2144, respectively. In addition, regardless of the official notice features, claims 20-22 depend from claim 1 (through intervening claim 18, which is not specifically rejected), and thus benefit from like argument.

Claims 24 and 25: The Examiner again takes official notice, this time stating that it is "old and well known" to profile a customer at a fourth terminal and providing advertising information based on a user profile. Again, regardless of the official notice

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features, amended claims 24 and 25 (now reciting only first and second kiosks) depend from claim 1 and benefit from like argument. We also again request reconsideration and evidence pursuant to MPEP §2142 and §2144, respectively.

We further note that claims 24 and 25 require communicating advertising information at the kiosk from which customer profiling was performed. This differs from the passage in Kaplan, quoted above in support of claim 1, which recites gathering customer data files into market research products. Kaplan's products are not advertising communicated at the kiosks, but are intended for distribution "in the record industry and radio stations." Kaplan, ¶ [0046], quoted above. This is clearly different from obtaining routinely obtaining, at the server, operational status of a kiosk.

Claims 26-29: The Examiner takes official notice that it would have been obvious to modify Kanoh by managing advertisements or inventory via a personal computer connected to the internet in order to allow managing remote from a server, in order to provide for changing and optimizing of advertising or determining inventory as new products are released and old ones retired. However, claims 26-29 depend from claim 1, and are therefore non-obvious at least because claim 1 is non-obvious. We also again request reconsideration and evidence pursuant to MPEP §2142 and §2144, respectively.

Claims 30, 38 and 39: Official notice is taken that it is "old and well known" to send a coupon based on inventory of a kiosk. We disagree and contend that the limitations of claims 30, 38 and 39 are non-obvious as combined in the '444 Application's claims, and we respectfully request reconsideration and evidence to the contrary, again pursuant to MPEP §2142 and §2144, respectively. However, we also note these claims depend from claim 1, and benefit from like argument.

Claim 33: The Examiner also takes official notice that, although Kanoh/Shah/Kaplan does not teach communicating at least one of a voice or text message to an administration by a mobile phone, pager, email or other wireless device, it is "notoriously old and well known". We disagree and contend that the limitations of

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claims 30, 38 and 39 are non-obvious as combined in the '444 Application's claims, and we respectfully respect reconsideration and evidence to the contrary, again pursuant to MPEP §2142 and §2144, respectively. However, we also note that claim 33 depends not only from claim 1, but from claims 31 and 32, which are not specifically rejected. Claims 31 and 32 require identifying alarm states associated with a kiosk (31) and automatically sending information about the alarm states to an administration associated with the central server (32).

As previously argued, Kanoh does not identify an alarm state associated with operation of a kiosk, nor does Kanoh automatically inform an administration about such alarm state. For example, as described in the '444 Application, a central server 103 polls the kiosks and generates alarm states if information from the kiosks is not normal. "Alarm states may be generated for any of a variety of reasons, for example indicating: that kiosk 200 is not on; an incorrect inventory; security breaches; incorrect readings by any internal device or sensors; and combinations thereof." Specification, page 14, lines 16-19.

The only alarms in Kanoh are generated if "information of the returned cassette as read by the reader 61 indicates that the cassette is not one under management of the automatic renting apparatus 3, or when the identification information of the video cassette cannot be read." Kanoh col. 8, lines 33-37. Kanoh discloses that in such a case, "After issuing an alarm, if the user does not remove the video cassette from the renting and returning opening 36 (step ST92), the video cassette is stored in a vacant storage shelf among the auxiliary storage shelves 30a of the auxiliary storage portion 30." Kanoh col. 8, lines 42-46. Clearly, Kanoh's alarms are related to a video cassette, and not to operational status of a kiosk.

Shah also fails to teach alarms associated with a kiosk. Like Kanoh, Shah can provide signals related to rented articles, if the rented articles are incorrectly coded for a particular bin. See Shah claim 17. However, there is no teaching of alarms associated

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with a kiosk, or of reporting such alarms to an administration. Kaplan also fails to teach alarms associated with a kiosk, or reporting such alarms to an administration.

Because the Kanoh/Shah/Kaplan combination does not teach or suggest claims 32, 31 or 1, it cannot teach or suggest dependent claim 33.

Claims 38-40: These claims require distributing a coupon to users of a first kiosk activated by a transaction at the kiosk. Again, the Examiner takes official notice that such limitations are old and well known. We again request reconsideration and evidence pursuant to MPEP §2142 and §2144, respectively. However, regardless of the official notice, these claims depend from claim 1 and benefit from like argument.

Claim 41: The Examiner also states that remote administration taking place via a web interface is old and well known, even though Kanoh, Shah and Kaplan do not teach or suggest such a limitation. We again request reconsideration, and evidence that the features of claim 41, in the combination presented therein, would have been obvious to one skilled in the art at the time the invention was made, (pursuant to MPEP §2142 and §2144, respectively). However, we again must respectfully note that regardless of the official notice, claim 41 benefits from the arguments presented in support of claim 1.

As shown, Kanoh in view of Shah and Kaplan does not establish *prima facie* obviousness over claims 1, 3-7, 9-21 and 23-41. We respectfully request both the withdrawal of the Examiner's rejections under 35 U.S.C. § 103, and allowance of claims 1, 3-7, 9-21 and 23-41.

Response to Arguments

The Examiner states that Applicant's prior arguments have been considered but are moot in view of the new ground(s) of rejection. However, the Examiner has not addressed several of Applicant's prior points in this Office Action. In particular, we ask that the Examiner clarify or respond to the following:

Claims 3, 18 and 19

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These claims are not specifically rejected, nor are they indicated as having allowable subject matter. We believe that this is due to the recitation of a "second kiosk" in these claims, and the previous confusion as to the relationship between first and second kiosks. However, we have amended the claims to clarify that the first and second kiosks are different. Given the clarifying amendments made herein, we respectfully request the Examiner's consideration of these claims and the arguments presented in support thereof, both herein and in Applicants' prior Response.

Claims 23, 31-32, 34-37

These claims do not recite a second kiosk. However, like claims 3, 18 and 19, they are not specifically rejected, nor are they indicated as having allowable subject matter. We respectfully request the Examiner's consideration of these claims and the arguments presented in support thereof, herein and in Applicants' prior Response.

Restriction/Election

The Examiner has not responded to Applicants' prior arguments that claim 1 is generic to claim 63, and that Groups I and III should therefore be examined together. These arguments are reiterated herein, and we respectfully request the Examiner's reply:

Regarding Applicant's argument that Group I and Group III should be examined together, the Examiner states that "In the present case, the species claims do not require all the limitations of the generic claim. For instance, the proposed species claims recite a plurality of kiosks, while claim 1 recites "one or more" kiosks. *The proposed species do not require that the number of kiosks can be one.*" Office Action p. 2, third paragraph, emphasis added.

Respectfully, we disagree with the Examiner's reasoning. As the Examiner notes, per MPEP § 806.04(d), a generic claim "should require no material element additional to those required by the species claims, and each of the species claims must require all the limitations of the generic claim." The Examiner appears to be applying section 806.04(d) in reverse, requiring that the species claims have no element additional to the generic claim.

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Applicant's claim 1 recites "one or more kiosks". The proposed species claims recite "a plurality of kiosks." Contrary to the Examiner's statement, the species claims do require the limitation of one kiosk because *there cannot be a plurality of kiosks without there being one kiosk*. The proposed species claims therefore do require all the limitations (one kiosk) of the generic claim. To further insure the correct correspondence between generic claim 1 and the aforementioned species claims, claim 63 is amended to mirror the amendment made to claim 1. We maintain that groups I and III should be examined together, thus, Applicant's traverse of the Restriction Requirement stands.

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CONCLUSION

This Amendment and Response is filed within two months from the mailing date of the associated Office Action. We thus respectfully request an Advisory Action. However, if any issues remain outstanding, the Examiner is encouraged to telephone the undersigned attorney prior to issuing the Advisory Action.

No fees are believed due. However, if any fee is deemed necessary in connection with this Amendment and Response, the Commissioner is hereby authorized to charge Deposit Account No. 12-0600.

Respectfully submitted,

Date: 6-30-06

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